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OLD ORTHODOXIES AMID NEW EXPERIENCES:
THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA) LITIGATION
AND THE UNCERTAIN JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
EDWARD GoRDON*

The obscurity into which the International Court of Justice
seems to have languished brings to mind an observation made
not long ago by Richard C. Hottelet, C. B. S. news correspondent writing in mitigation of charges that the United Nations
was yielding its destiny by default. Wrote Hottelet:
If the organization and its efforts seem
than real - even ridiculous or contemptible
ing for dramatic successthat is because
light of what it could have tried and should
have been.'

pale, somewhat less
to those with a cravit is regarded in the
have done and might

Applied to any institutional decision process, such subjunctive
criteria presume that there exist relatively stable expectations
concerning the nature of the institution, the objectives it ought
to be pursuing, and the limits of its capacity to pursue them.
Specifically, with respect to the World Court, they presume
some qualitative identification of the institution as an adjudicative process, one that derives from an empirically-oriented understanding of the bases of its authority to decide disputes, the
sources of decisional criteria it applies, and the interaction constantly taking place between the Court and other institutionalized decision processes, especially the larger political process
by which the Court's judgments are transformed into social
2
action.
Yet, in assessing the Court's apparent predicament, one is
struck by the prominence in its jurisprudence of an assumption
that courts of law are essentially homogeneous, that the Court
is cast in substantially the same mold as courts of law are
everywhere, inevitably cast. Arguably, this attitude serves to
accommodate the diverse jurisprudential predispositions which
the Court as an ecumenical judiciary collects. It does so, however, at the extravagant price of ignoring contextual and phenomenological differences.
1. Dimensions of the Utility of International Adjudication
In the Conditions of Admission case, the late Judge Alvarez
wrote that:
*Member, New York Bar. Copyright is retained by the author.
I Book review, Washington Post, October 25, 1970, at 5.
2 This transformation is the focus of inquiry in W. M. REISMAN, NULLITY
AND REVISION (1970).
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[T]he fact should be stressed that an institution, once established,
acquires a life of its own, independent of the elements which have
given birth to it, and it must develop, not in accordance with the
views of those who created it, but in accordance with the require3
ments of international life.

The life of the Court, too, is an ongoing process. Neither the
the United Nations Charter nor the Court's own Statute4 reveals
any eternal verities about international courts. 5 Each describes
the latter in greater detail - the formal structure of the
Court, the more or less technical characteristics of its procedures and proceedings: for all purposes relevant to the present
inquiry, its institutional shell. For its substantive character,
indeed for that of any adjudicative institution, one must look
not only to its conceptual and structural origins, but also to
the internal commerce of people and ideas which are its lifeblood and to the interaction with contending social processes
which identify its social experiences.
This is not to suggest that courts of law are invariably
spontaneous exercises in political imagination, much less that
diversity for its own sake is an institutional virtue. Rather, it
is to suggest that courts of law are by their very nature social
experiments, heterogeneous even when apparently isomorphic,
which become and remain justifiable allocations of social decision prerogatives only to the extent that the cumulative effects
of their judgments and the values6 they comprehend conform
to the needs and goal-objectives of the communities they serve.7
It follows that perceptions of the Court as an institution
which are based for the most part upon its terminological identification as a "court," or even as the "principal judicial organ"
of the U.N., are mistaken in assuming that its retention of what
are thought to be traditional juridical conventions assures its
worth to the world community. Seemingly constant or fundamental similarities among dispute settlement modalities identified as judicial ones can establish useful enough starting points
or generalized parameters for distinguishing a particular process
or its techniques from others. However, it becomes ironic and
3 Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations,
[1947-48] I.C.J. Rep. at 68 (separate opinion). See generally E. Gordon,
The World Court and the Interpretation of Constitutive Treaties, 59
AM. J. INT'L L. 794, 826-32 (1965).
4 Hereinafter the "Charter" and the "Statute," respectively.
5 See Goldie, The Connally Reservation: A Shield for an Adversary, 9
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 277, 280 (1962).
6 The term "value" is used herein to refer to -preferred events as a class.
See H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY 56-73 (1950); and
M. McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 31-36 (1960).

Compare REISMAN, supra note 2, at 221.
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self-defeating when such identifying generalities- themselves
no more than the sum or average of past and current institua
tional adaptations to social and political conditions -deprive
contemporary institution such as the Court of the capacity to
adapt to the unique social and political conditions with which
it is empirically confronted.
The Court's capacity so to adapt depends upon the extent
to which its jurisprudential values refer in rational, empirical
terms to the needs and goal-objectives of the world community.
To that extent, mere conformity to past or supposedly perfect
models of juridical performance runs the risk of interfering
with the development of a socially useful jurisprudence or, at
best, of being no more than coincidental to it.
Jenks," Reisman" and Rosenne, 0 each according to his own
analytical style, have surveyed the elements of adjudication
which have accorded it certain advantages over other decision
modalities in the international arena. From their several approaches and notwithstanding differences in emphasis among
them, four summary categories of advantageous qualities seem
to emerge: (1) the relative fairness of the process (e.g., disputants tend to be equalized, decision determinants tend to
be generalized and applied consistently in like circumstances);
(2) its substitution of persuasive strategies for those of raw or
coercive force; (3) its restriction of the conflict to a largely
symbolic adversarial battleground; and (4) the cathartic effects
of its ritualized form of combat. Clearly, these categories are
not parallel. Virtually all international litigation achieves the
second and third, before it becomes certain whether the first
and fourth have also been accomplished. For the Court, achieving all four outcomes appears to be desirable in terms of reacquiring popular acceptance.
Popular expectations about both the techniques of adjudication and their consequences do not always correspond to the
essentials of institutional social utility. For instance, adjudication has now proved its case, so to speak, in so many societal
settings that it is sometimes assumed to be an indispensable
element of societal development' 1 Rosenne notes that the inteS C. W. JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION

(1964).

9 REISMAN, supra note 2, especially ch. 8.
10 S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1965).

1 Professor Reisman argues that "It is historically untenable to contend
that some sort of adjudicative system is an invariable manifestation of
community organization cr that no community, as such, has ever existed
without such a process." REISMAN, supra note 2, at 228. But he adds:
"Historical studies and anthropological data do, however, suggest that

68

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 1

gration of the Court into the United Nations political system
proceeded from an analogous assumption "that the world organization, already possessed of executive, deliberative and administrative organs, would be incomplete unless it possessed a
fully integrated judicial system of its own."' 2 Whether or not
this assumption is supportable historically appears to depend
upon the degree of generality with which one defines "judicial
system." ' From a contemporary vantage point, if one adheres
to the formulation of social utility herein presented, the indispensability of adjudication to the development of an international public order certainly has yet to be proved.
This seems equally true of a host of other assumptions
about and popular attitudes towards adjudication, notwithstanding the rear guard contention that the sum of all popular expectations about adjudication, regardless of the empirical validity of each of them, has contributed to the durability of adjudication as a social decision process. Illustrating popular enchantment with non-vital aspects of adjudication, Professor
Reisman alludes to the "compelling romanticism attached to a
dramatic arena (with an audience) in which individual champions match skills in a duel for high stakes;" with the assumption that "truth will tell" in an adversarial process; and with the
depiction of adjudication as the acme of civilized dispute resolution.15 One might add, as a further illustration, the contagious
illusion that the rigorous constraints of strict reason, faithfully
observed by judges, assures absolutely their neutrality and
that of the judgment criteria (i.e., the law) they invoke. 16
In terms of consciously enhancing the contemporary worth
of the Court, reliance upon essentially irrational attitudes towards adjudication is a doubtful strategy. The spread of scientific inquiry to the social sciences is exposing all of our social
institutions to the intolerant glare of systematic, rational scrutiny, exposure to which our legal institutions, for the most part,
have not previously been subjected to such a degree. As Rosenne
14
attention to realities, harsh though they may be,
observes,'
as the interaction rate of a society increased, and some structural specialization developed, institutionalized and ritualized decision processes
emerged." Id. at 229.
S. ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 36 (1962).
13See Schwartz & Miller, Legal Evolution and Societal Complexity, 70
AM. J. Soc. 159, 168 (1964).
14 Supra note 10, at 6.
15 REISMAN, supra note 2, at 7. As to the last-mentioned of these, compare
JENKS, supra note 8, especially ch. 11.
16 Discussed recently in Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition,
and the Supreme Court 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971).
12

OLD ORTHODOXIES AMID NEW EXPERIENCES

cannot spoil an institution of proved and accepted worth. It
can, to the contrary, help to rid it of impediments to its continuing social merit.
It is not essential to a rejection of irrationality as a strategy
for enhancing the social worth of the Court that one reject all
expectations of dubious empirical validity, or even outright
misconceptions of the nature of adjudicative techniques, are
bound to compromise the integrity of the process or lead to its
disintegration once exposed. To begin with, this simply is not
the case. It is no longer a novel proposition that bell, book and
candle have as legitimate a claim to the history of adjudication
as a social decision process as do, say, reason and social justice.
Indeed, in our own country's judicial history the generous allocation of decision-making prerogatives to courts of law, although owing in part to the Supreme Court's early and successful appropriation of the power to review the acts of other
branches of government for their constitutionality,1" seems to
have its ultimate source in some essentially emotional attitudes
toward authority and decisiveness which in our society are transferred in a collective way to judicial tribunals, especially our
highest ones. Whether this generosity would have been as
lavish if popular attitudes towards adjudication were required
to undergo some test of empirical validity is problematical.
Nonetheless, if social influence is a proper measure of institutional vigor, then one cannot help but observe, in the spirit of
de Tocqueville, that we have become highly accustomed to reducing to legal value symbols and to resolving in judicial
combat an imposing variety of social conflicts embracing contending social values.'"
The point, in any event, is not that all irrational attitudes
must be swept away in the name of institutional integrity, regardless of whether the institution expires in the process. It is
that any inquiry whose purpose is the redirection of institutional energies to more empirically relevant ends cannot be
oblivious to transempirical directives when these are apparent
or implicit in the institution's work product. It is, moreover,
that such redirection of energies must proceed rationally to be
worthwhile.

Cf. A. M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), especially ch. 1.
IS A circumstance not al.ways regarded as wholesome, e.g., D. Acheson,
The Purloined Papers, New York Times, July 7, 1971 at 37, col. 1.
17
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Dangers Inherent in Reified
Identity

2.

Concepts of
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Institutional

Reified concepts of the Court's identity, often concepts
which assume fixed characteristics about the institution on
the basis of its terminological identity alone, usually appear
in the form of statements that the Court, because it is a court
of law-or the judges, because they are juridical beingsmust adhere to some line of reasoning or, in the negative, must
not undertake some proposed inquiry or follow some proposed
line of reasoning. To do otherwise, so the logic suggests, is to
deprive the resulting judgment of its judicial character. Taken
literally, the norm appears to prohibit inquiry into the decision
to which it leads, let alone its policy content. It runs, to borrow
Karl Llewellyn's phrase, in deductive form with an air or expression of single-line inevitability.'" Thus, in the Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons, Preliminary Objections, the Court
observed:
There are inherent limitations on the exercise of the judicial
function which the Court, as a Court of Justice, can never ignore.
There may thus be an incompatibility between the desires of an
applicant, or, indeed, of both parties to a case, on the one hand,
and on the other hand the duty of the Court to maintain its judiparties, must be the
cial character. The Court itself, and not the
20
guardian of the Court's judicial integrity.

Because the consequences of "losing" the presumed judicial
character are often, as here, left ominously vague, and because
that character tends to be identified on an ad hoc, rather than
a systematic basis, the sentiment expressed in Northern Cameroons by the Court easily lends itself to service as euphemistic
rationale for decisional preferences which result, consciously
or unconsciously, from unidentified policy considerations. One
recalls in this vein a comment of the late Judge Lauterpachtindicative of his judicial perspective although in fact written
in 1949 prior to his election to the Court-in which he noted ...
that judicial rules of construction are:
not the determining cause of judicial decision, but the form in
which the judge cloaks a result arrived at by other means . . .
[T]he very choice of any single rule or of a combination . . .
of them is the result of a judgment arrived at independently of
any rules of construction, by reference 21to considerations of good
faith, of justice, and of public policy.
19K.

20
21

LLEWELLYN,

THE

COMMON

LAW

TRADrnION-DECIDING

APPEALS

38

(1960).
[1963] I.C.J. Rep. at 29.
Restrictive Interpretationand the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 48, 52 (1949).
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Accordingly, there is cause for suspicion when the Court appears to resign itself to purportedly unalterable rules of inquiry.
No doubt, there are practical limits beyond which the Court
itself, operating within its distinctive political environment,
ought to pursue the resolution of a question before it. It is
when presumed limits are pronounced in the name of judicial
verities, without reference to empirical distinctions among
courts, that the Court's submission to the fates of adjudication
tends to become illusory self-denial of the existence of judicial
choice. The more ambiguous the source or reference of the
presumed imperatives, naturally, the more likely it is that a
denial of judicial choice serves to conceal-even from the
judges themselves-the fact that the judges, not the imperatives, are actually responsible for the results which follow.
The presence of imperatives which conceal judicial volition
is most apparent in cases whose outcome promises to be controversial, where the nature of the dispute before them leaves
the judges with no real alternative to performing transparently
coordinate political functions. Especially for an undecided
judge, the illusion of preordained passivity serves to soothe an
uneasy conscience and, perhaps, to persuade him to accede to
what is apt to be the more unpopular of several possible
rulings. Willy-nilly, a judge may reason (or instinctively feel),
in merely being a judge he is not doing anything for which it
would be proper to hold him personally accountable.
This calls to mind an observation of Justice Holmes, viz:
I think it is important to remember whenever a doubtful case
arises, with analogies on one side and other analogies on the other,

that what is really before us is a conflict between two social
desires, each of which seeks to extend its dominion over the case,
and which cannot both have their way.... When there is doubt
the simple tool of logic does not suffice, and even if it is disguised
or unconscious, the judges are called upon to exercise the sov22
ereign prerogative of choice.

In the tradition of legal realism, Justice Holmes' insights
seem self-evident. Yet, when competition between social ideas
finds its way into the courtroom, courts come under attack for
venturing beyond their rightful limits and efforts are made to
distinguish judicial functions from political ones. Where constitutional guidelines distribute authority among various branches
of government, typically the case in national political systems,
the distinction concentrates on the branch of government whose
authority the courts are allegedly usurping. However, the U.N.
22

"Law in Science and Science in Law," in Collected Legal Papers 229
(1920), cited in E.

RoSTOW, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE

(1962), at xiii.
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political system is not possessed of an analogous distribution
of political authority and, as Rosenne points out, "while it is
frequently possible in the Charter to differentiate between
[particular] functions, it is quite another matter when it comes
to differentiating either the organs, or the applicable techniques. '23 Often, when the Court itself considers whether or
not to deal with a particular issue because the issue is intertwined with political considerations, its frame of reference is
a reified concept of the Court as a judicial - which is sometimes to say, non-political - institution. 24 Justiciability tends to
be regarded as an unchanging quality, reified along with the
Court's institutional identity.
3.

The South West Africa Litigation

What brings these thoughts to mind is the prolonged South
West Africa litigation, particularly its two most recent episodes. The litigation, it will be recalled, grew out of the extension by the Republic of South Africa of its domestic racial
policies into territory - "South West Africa" or, as it is now
called in the U.N., "Namibia" - it administers as the result
of a League of Nations mandate (hereinafter the "Mandate").
The original gravamen of the complaint against South Africa
was that its administration of the Mandate has been inconsistent
with applicable international standards and a violation of its
obligations under Article 2 of the Mandate "to promote to the
utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory." South Africa has
denied the charges and has maintained that, in any event, with
the dissolution of the League of Nations the League's supervisory rights over the administration of the Mandate have
lapsed and neither the U.N. nor former members of the League
have succeeded to the League's legal rights or interests therein.
The legal issues to which the dispute has been reduced have
been overshadowed, by and large, by its political, indeed ideological, content. Legality, as dispensed by the Court, has been
a symbol for social propriety, for conformity with the Charter
23 ROSENNE,
24

supra note 10, at 3.

The present writer has previously had occasion to describe the distinction
between judicial and political tasks appearing in the Court's own jurisprudence. GORDON, supra note 3, at 800. He concluded then, as he does
now that the Court would one day be drawn to the conclusion that legal
and political tasks are not mutually exclusive, that adjudication is a social
process which rightly and inherently interacts with all other important
institutions and processes of organized society, and that especially for
the Court, given its hybrid judicial-diplomatic character -little is accomplished and much is concealed from analysis by any attempt to
place the two functional areas in dialectical opposition.
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or, to the extent that general principles of international law
circumscribe the goal-objectives of the Charter, for conformity
with general international law. However, for the Court, the
matter has also evoked root questions of its competence to hear
and decide a dispute which has been social and political, as
well as, above all, controversial.
By 1966 the matter had come before the Court in one context or another on five occasions. In 1950, responding to a request from the General Assembly, the Court handed down an
advisory opinion2 5 to the effect that the Territory was still
under international mandate; that South Africa retained her
international obligations under the Mandate; that the supervisory powers, particularly the right to receive and examine
annual reports from South Africa, previously exercised by the
League, were to be exercised by the U.N.; and that South
Africa was not competent to modify the international status
of the Territory without the U.N.'s consent. In 195526 and
1956,27 in each instance at the request of the General Assembly,
the Court handed down further opinions confirming the supervisory role of the U.N. over South Africa's administration of
the Mandate.
(a)

The South West Africa Cases

The parties to the Statute do not undertake to be bound by
the Court's advisory opinions, however, and South Africa not
unexpectedly refused to accept the three opinions pertaining
to the Mandate. In reaction, the Empire of Ethiopia and the
Republic of Liberia, the only African States other than South
Africa which had been members of the League, initiated contentious proceedings against South Africa in 1960, attempting
thereby to transform the Court's previous opinions into a "binding" judgment which might be enforced by the Security Council under Article 94 of the Charter. 2s The applicants asked the
Court to confirm its earlier rulings and to declare, in so many
25 International Status of South West Africa, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 128.
26 Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory of South West Africa, [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 67.
27 Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West
Africa, [1956] I.C.J. Rep. 23.
28 Article 94 of the Charter provides as follows:
1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply
with the decisicn of the International Court of Justice in any case to
which it is a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party
may have recourse to the Security Council which may, if it deems
necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be
taken to give effect to the judgment.
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words, that South Africa had violated its obligations under
the Mandate.
In 1961, South Africa raised certain preliminary objections29 which, under the Court's procedural rules, had the effect
of suspending the proceedings on the merits. The objections
were based upon the language of Article 7(2) of the Mandate,
which provides that:
if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory
and another member of the League of Nations relating to the
interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate,
such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

and Article 37 of the Statute, which states that:
whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of
a matter . . . to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the
matter shall be referred to the International Court of Justice.

South Africa contended that the Mandate was not a "treaty
or convention in force" within the meaning of Article 37;
neither of the applicants could be described as "another member of the League of Nations" as required for locis standi by
Article 7(2) of the Mandate; there was no dispute as envisaged
by Article 7(2) in that no material interests of the applicants
or of their nationals were involved; and the applicants had
made no attempt to negotiate a settlement of the dispute with
South Africa.
By a vote of eight to seven, the Court dismissed these objections, remarking at one point that:
[T]he manifest scope and purport of the provisions of [Article 7]
indicate that the Members of the League were understood to have
a legal right or interest in the observance by the Mandatory of
its obligations both toward the inhabitants of the Mandated Territory, and toward the League of Nations and its members.30

However, in 1966, in the proceedings on the merits- the socalled Second Phase,31 -the
Court in effect reversed itself,
this time when a seven to seven tie vote was broken, pursuant
to the Statute, 32 by the casting vote of the President of the
Court, Sir Percy Spender. The Court decided that the applicants had not established any legal right or interest in the subject matter of their claim, that is, in the observance by South
Africa of its obligations under the Mandate.
To reach this conclusion, the Court chose to review the
South West Africa Cases, Preliminary Objections, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 319.
Id. at 343.
31 South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, [1966] I.C.J. Rep. 4.
3
2 Art. 55(2).
29
30
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entire mandate system, not just the Mandate itself, for it felt
that the Mandate enjoyed certain features in common with the
other mandates. The substantive provisions of mandates, the
Court found, could be divided into two categories: first, those
articles defining the mandatory's obligations in respect of the
inhabitants of the territory and toward the League (which the
Court labelled "conduct" provisions); and second, articles conferring rights relative to the mandated territory directly upon
members of the League as individual States, or in favor of
their nationals (which the Court called "special interests" provisions). The Court determined that the dispute before it related solely to the conduct provisions of the Mandate and that
these provisions did not confer any legal right or interest in
individual members of the League. Not even the subsequent
dissolution of the League could have invested its members
with legal rights or interests in the conduct provisions, the
Court said, inasmuch as the mandatories were agents of the
League, not of its members individually, so that it followed
that the applicants could not possess after the League's dissolution rights of intervention they had not possessed while it
was still in existence. Therefore, case dismissed.
Professor Dugard subsequently summarized the Court's explanation of its different treatment in 1966 of the issue, apparently resolved in applicants' favor in 1962, of their standing
to sue:
In brief the Court held that in 1962 it had been faced solely
with a question of jurisprudence and that it had not been called
upon to decide whether the applicants had an interest in the due
performance by South Africa of her obligations under the Mandate (even if it had done so in a 'provisional' way). This was a
question for determination at the merits stage, irrespective of
whether it was classified as a question relating to the merits
but of an 'antecedent character' or as a question relating to the
33
admissibility of the claim.

The "antecedent character" of the question demanded its resolution at the outset of the Court's consideration of the merits of
the rival claims, the Court held. To say the least, this priority
struck some observers as contrived, result-oriented, and in any
event the result of, not the reason for, the majority's decision
to deny applicants' claim. At the same time, incidentally or
not, treating the question as antecedent and deciding it against
33

The reader's attention is drawn to this concise and lucid summary of the
South West Africa litigation through 1966 by Professor John Dugard of
the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, which appears under the
title, The South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, 1966, 83 S. AFR. L. J.

429, 440 (1966).
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the applicants at the outset enabled the court to avoid the
gravamen of their complaint.
One auxiliary participant in the litigation, recalling its
planned and inadvertent strategies, has likened litigation to a
two-person zero-sum game in which plaintiff and defendant
stand to win or lose the same precisely defined amount.34 Even
assuming there are only two litigants, matters often do not
work out so neatly in practice, especially if one is inclined
to regard the court as a third participant in any litigation and
the relevant community as a fourth. Yet, to the extent that
what were at stake in the South West Africa Cases were, first,
a value symbol and, second, an effort to transform a previous
judicial allocation of that value symbol into effective social
action, South Africa may be said to have "won" and the applicants, for the time being at least, to have "lost." For this to
have happened it was not essential that the Court decide the
substantive issues in South Africa's favor. Even without deciding these issues, the Court left the impression that international
law does not forbid what South Africa is doing in the Territory.
That this impression is not strictly justified by the logic or
specific holding of the decision does not alter the fact that it
was widely enough held for South Africa thereafter to adopt
a posture of legality for its administration of South West
Africa.3 5
It could hardly have escaped notice that one practical explanation for the Court's change of heart between 1962 and
1966 was the intervening change in the composition of the
bench. Judges Badawi and Bustamente, each of whom had
voted against South Africa's preliminary objections, were unable to participate in the merits phase because of ill health
(Judge Badawi died during the pendency of the proceedings).
Judge Zafrullah Khan, apparently against his own wishes, was
persuaded to recuse himself, perhaps because of the partisanship
implicit in his having been appointed ad hoc judge by the applicants prior to being elected to the Court as a regular member.
Such shifts in the Court's ideological center of gravity, not surprising in view of the length of the litigation,36 serve to remind
its critics that the Court is not as utterly depoliticized a process
:14 D'Amato, Legal and Political Strategies of the South West Africa Liti-

gation, 4 L. IN TRANs. Q. 8 (1967).
When the Security Council later came to reintroduce the matter to the
judicial arena, infra, one factor bearing on its decision to do so was a
desire to deny this posture to South Africa. See S.W. Africa Plea to
World Court, The Times (London), July 31, 1970.
:1 Dugard, supra note 33, at 434.
35
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as some abstract theory would have it. Indeed, judicial history
everywhere testifies to its interplay with social tensions, however abrasive they may be, however momentous the interests
at stake, however reluctant courts may be to become involved
in what appears as open competition with other decision-making
institutions. If Professor Falk is correct in describing as carelessness the failure of Afro-Asian countries to oppose the election of judges to the Court who held views antithetical to their
main concerns, 3 perhaps a contributing factor was a mistaken
assumption that courts of law are by their very nature insulated from social and political tensions.
It should be kept in mind that the 1966 decision did not
specifically disturb the Court's previous findings, in 1950, to the
effect that the U.N. had succeeded to the supervisory functions
of the League. 3 The general thrust of the Court's holding in
1966 was that the Court itself was not suited to resolve the
question before it, because it is just a court of law. The reasoning was foreshadowed in 1962 in the joint dissenting opinion
of Judges Fitzmaurice and Spender, their voice later becoming
that of the majority in the Second Phase:
The proper forum for the appreciation and application of a
provision of this kind [i.e., Article 2 of the Mandate] is unques-

tionably a technical or political one, such as (formerly) the Permanent Mandate Commission, or the Council of the League of

Nations-or today (as regards Trusteeships), the Trusteeship
Council and the Assembly of the United Nations.
added.) 39

(Emphasis

Unquestionably? But then what is the source of an unquestionable directive for the Court to eschew the interpretation of an
instrument which allegedly gives rise to international legal
obligations, a task, the Court regularly declares, which is a
40
distinctly judicial one?
American courts have found that whether or not they are
ideally suited in each instance to deal with the disputes they
are asked to resolve, there is little likelihood that they will
readily be forgiven for attempting to excuse themselves from
the task, particularly if in doing so they appear to be deciding
the dispute obliquely and arbitrarily, according to some implicit
37 Falk, Realistic Horizons for International Adjudication, 11 VA. J. INT'L L.
314, 319 (1971).
38
See Dugard, The Revocation of the Mandate for South West Africa, 62
AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 82 (1968).
:s [1962] I.C.J. Rep. at 467.
40

E.g., P.C.I.J. ser. B, No. 10, at 17; P.C.I.J. ser. B, No. 13, at 23; Conditions
of Admission case, supra note 3, at 61; Certain Expenses of the United
Nations, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. at 155-56; and the Namibia opinion, infra at 24.

78

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 1

partisanship. Courts tend to be judged less by the niceties of
their internal logic than by the social consequences of their
decisions; 41 thus, for the Court to declare itself unfit to decide
a matter which had been before it for five years is to raise
grave doubts abouts its capacity to deal empirically with the
content of contemporary international legal disputes.
In citing an unquestionable state of judicial propriety, the
Court might have been expected to refer to the Charter, its
ultimate constitutive instrument, but it did not. In its Awards
of the Administrative Tribunal Opinion,42 the Court had taken
the position that it would be inconsistent with the Charter's
expressed aim of advancing the cause of freedom and justice
for individuals, and with the preoccupation of the U.N. to promote this aim, for there to be no judicial or arbitral remedy.
available for the claims of the U.N.'s own staff. In its selfdenial of the propriety of a judicial remedy for the inhabitants
of the Territory, however, the Court seemed to be unaware
or unwilling to concede that it, too, derives its institutional
objectives from the Charter. Certainly, the charge that the
Territory's inhabitants were being systematically deprived of
their individual freedom and justice is as deserving of judicial
attention as the grievances which the U.N.'s administrative
tribunal is likely to hear.
In fact, the case's humanitarian aspects were so pronounced
that the Court felt obliged to explain its refusal to consider
them, viz:
Throughout this case it has been suggested, directly or indirectly,
that humanitarian considerations are sufficient in themselves to
generate legal rights and obligations, and that the Court can and
should proceed accordingly. The Court does not think so. It is
a court of law, and can take account of moral principles only in
so far as these are given a sufficient expression in legal form. Law
exists, it is said, to serve a social need; but precisely for that
reason it can do so only through and within the limits of its own
discipline. Otherwise, it is not a legal service that would be
rendered.
...Humanitarian considerations may constitute the inspirational
basis for rules of law, just as, for instance, the preambular parts
of the United Nations Charter constitute the moral and political
basis for the specific legal provisions thereafter set forth. Such
considerations do not, however, in themselves amount to rules
of law. All States are interested - have an interest - in such
41
42

Cf. A. M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 175
(1970).
Advisory Opinion on the Effects of Awards of Compensation by the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal, [1954] I.C.J. Rep. 57. See also
Judge Read's dissenting opinion in Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., [1952] I.C.J.
Rep. 143-44.
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matters. But the existence of an 'interest' does not of itself entail
43
that this interest is specifically juridical in character.

It has been suggested earlier that transempirical imperatives
which stem from reified concepts of the Court's institutional
identity are apt to become the sleeves of judicial legerdemain.
The preceding excerpt is an example of a jurisprudential habit
which has lingered on without any regard for a change in
juridical environment. For if one simply accepts its appropriateness in the world community, and if its logic is to be taken
at its word, then in the absence of an authoritative legislature of international law even the most widely-shared comprinciples, standards, goal-objecmunity expectations -rules,
tives-will be unlikely to possess "sufficient expression in
legal form," until they have been translated into non-preambular treaty prescriptions. Yet, one knows that the Court does
not-under

Article

38(1)

of

its

Statute it

cannot-ignore

custom or general principles of law recognized internationally.
The Court's invocation of presumed juridical imperatives thus
only serves to conceal how the individual judges go about
deciding which community expectations should be judicially
supported, which expectations should qualify as sufficiently
important or fundamental to be vindicated against what are
44
presumed to be natural limits of the judicial process.
45
(b) The Namibia Opinion
Professor Falk has suggested that some members of the
Court may have been subconsciously reacting to the experience
4
of the Court's Certain Expenses opinion and decided that it
was better for the Court not to decide at all than to decide
and then have its decision ignored:

In essence, the Fitzmaurice-Spender view of the ICJ role, which
carried the day, opposed entrusting any role to the Court which
of the political organs
might make it carry out judicially the will
47
of the U.N.; better not to decide at all.

In any case, following the announcement of the Court's decision,
the General Assembly took matters into its own hands, passing
a resolution 48 which declared that:
South Africa has failed to fulfill its obligations in respect of the
administration of the Mandated Territory and to ensure the moral
43

[1966] I.C.J. Rep. 24.

44 Cf. BICKEL, supra note 17, at 55.

Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. Rep. 16.
46Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. at 155-56.
47 Falk, supra note 37, at 317-18.
48 G. A. Res. 2145 (XXI); 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 649 (1967).
45
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and material well-being and security of the indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa, and has, in fact, disavowed the
Mandate.

and decided that:
the Mandate conferred upon his Britannic Majesty to be exercised
on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa
is therefore terminated, that South Africa has no other right to
administer the Territory and that henceforth South West Africa
comes under the direct responsibility of the United Nations.

The General Assembly continued to pursue the matter, implementing the foregoing resolution with one establishing a United
Nations Council for Namibia to administer the Territory until
49
independence.
It is worth recalling that the General Assembly did not ask
the Court for assistance in determining the lawfulness of South
Africa's administration of the Territory. Professor Dugard noted
at the time"° that the General Assembly had refrained from
doing so because (1) the Court might have declined to give
an opinion in accordance with the ruling in the Eastern Carelia
Case5 ' that its advisory machinery should not be used for obtaining a decision in an actual dispute between States; (2) after
the 1966 decision the Assembly was reluctant to send the matter back to the Court at all; (3) advisory opinions are not binding and South Africa had refused to accept the three earlier
ones; and (4) an advisory opinion dealing with South Africa's
compliance with the Mandate could do no more than augment
the judicial guidance the Assembly had already received in the
separate opinions of those judges who, in 1966, did direct their
attention to the ultimate merits of the dispute. Of the six
judges (out of fourteen) who examined the compatibility of
South Africa's administration of the Mandate in terms of the
obligation "to promote to the utmost" the welfare of the inhabitants of the Territory, only the South African, Judge ad hoc
52
Van Wyk, found in favor of South Africa.
The General Assembly, accordingly, arrived at its own findings and enlisted the cooperation of the Security Council,
which thereupon proceeded on the basis of the Assembly's
resolution. On March 29, 1969, the Council called upon South
Africa to immediately withdraw its administration from the
G. A. Res. 2248 (s-v), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 1, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/6657
(1967). See generally, Dugard, supra note 38; and Engers, The United
Nations Travel and Identity Document for Namibians, 65 AM. J. INT'L L.
571 (1971).
5 Dugard, supra note 38, at 82-83.
51 Eastern Carelia Case, [1923] P.C.I.J. ser. B, No. 5.
52 [1966] I.C.J. Rep. 140-193.
41)
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Territory;5 3 on August 12, 1969, it once again called upon South
Africa to withdraw, "in any case before 4 October 1969;" ' on
January 30, 1970, it decided inter alia to establish an ad hoc
sub-committee to study, in consultation with the SecretaryGeneral, ways and means by which the relevant resolutions of
the Council could be effectively implemented;;- and, finally, on
July 29, 1970, the Council adopted a recommendation of the
sub-committee and requested the Court to render an advisory
opinion on the question:
What are the legal consequences for States of the continued
presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security
Council resolution 276 (1970)?5"

Nearly a year later, on June 21, 1971, the Court handed down
an opinion in which it found (1) (by a vote of 13 to 2) that
the continued presence of South Africa in the Territory being
illegal, South Africa is under an obligation to withdraw its
administration therefrom immediately and thus put an end to
its occupation of the Territory; (2) (by a vote of 11 to 4) that
Members of the U.N. are under an obligation to recognize the
illegality of South Africa's presence in the Territory and the
invalidity of its acts on behalf of the Territory, and to refrain
from any acts and in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of,
or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration. The latter conclusion was supplemented with one which
found it incumbent upon States which are not members of the
U.N. to give assistance, within the scope of the foregoing, in
the action which has been taken by-the U.N. with regard to the
57
Territory.
Once it decided to render an opinion, the Court was obliged
to deal with two substantive issues: first, the competence of
the U.N. to supervise the Mandate; and second, the liability
of the Mandate to (unilateral) revocation. 58 With respect to
the first of these, the Court relied heavily on its 1950 opinion,
observing that the well-being and development of the inhabitants of the mandated territories formed a "sacred trust of
civilization." The best method of giving practical effect to this
53 S.

C. Res. 264 (1969).

54 S.

C. Res. 269 (1969).
Res. 276 (1970).
Res. 284 (1970).

55 S. C.
56S. C.
.7
58

[1971] I.C.J. Rep. 31-32.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Fitzmaurice writes that in respect of both
these issues, "[T]he findings of the Ceurt involve formidable legal difficulties which the Opinion turns rather than meets, and sometimes hardly
seems to notice at all."
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principle, the Court said, quoting from Article 22 of the Covenant of the League, was for "the tutelage of such peoples ...
[to] be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their
resources, their experience or their geographical position can
best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept
it. . .

."

The acceptance of a mandate on these terms consti-

tuted the assumption of a binding legal obligation, the Court
found, and the question of quis custodiet ipsos custodes? had
been given in terms of the Mandatory's accountability to international organs. Annexation of the mandated territories, towards
which the Court felt South Africa was hinting, was deemed
fundamentally at odds with the foregoing principles.
South Africa had suggested that if it were maintained
the Mandate had lapsed, then she - South Africa - would have
the right to administer the Territory by reason of a combination of factors: its original conquest; its long occupation; the
continuation of the sacred trust basis agreed to in 1920; and
"because its administration is to the benefit of the inhabitants
of the Territory and is desired by them."51 This latter point
was supported, in effect, by two offers made by South Africa
during the hearings. The first of these, deferred by the Court
at the time (March, 1971), but subsequently rejected in light
of its findings, proposed the holding of a plebiscite in the Territory under the Court's supervision, to determine whether it
was the wish of the inhabitants "that the Territory should continue to be administered by the South African Government or
6
should henceforth be administered by the United Nations." 0
The second proposal, disposed of in an identical way by the
Court, was for the Court to permit South Africa to present
material bearing on the actual state of well-being and development of the inhabitants. In deferring action on the two proposals, the Court had said it did not want to anticipate, or
appear to anticipate, its decision.
The problem which the proposals posed for the Court was
that either of them would have put it into competition with
the General Assembly, since that body had presumably borne
in mind the administration of the Mandate in reaching its findings. It will be recalled that the Security Council had not asked
the Court to review the Assembly's findings and that the
Court's 1966 decision had left the distinct impression that the
Court prefers to leave such matters to other organs of the U.N.
When the Court ultimately came to reject South Africa's two
[1971] I.C.J. Rep. 43.
6OId. at 20.
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proposals, therefore, it did so on the grounds that
determined that the Mandate had been validly
the General Assembly and that "in consequence
presence in Namibia and its acts on behalf of
Namibia are illegal and invalid."' 1

it had already
terminated by
South Africa's
or concerning

Several governments had challenged the Assembly's adoption of resolution 2145 on the grounds that it had acted ultra
vires. The Court was thus confronted with the problem of
whether to assume the validity of the Assembly's action or to
subject it to judicial review. The canons of interpretation open
to the Court were rife; it could find support for the proposition
that, on the one hand, it completely lacked authority to review
actions taken by other organs of the U.N. without their specific
request to do so or, on the other hand, that judicial review was
implicitly authorized in the Security Council's request for an
advisory opinion (since it must have foreseen that no legal
organ would find legal consequences in attion which had been
invalid ab initio).
What the Court chose to do was to say one thing and do
another; that is, to first declare itself without authority to
initiate judicial review, and, having satisfied one and all on that
score, to immediately thereupon declare it would undertake
such a review in the exercise of its judicial function:
Undoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers of judicial review
or appeal in respect of the decisions taken by the United Nations
organs concerned. The question of the validity or conformity with
the Charter of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) or of related Security Council resolutions does not form the subject of
the request for [this] advisory opinion. However, in the exercise
of its judicial function and since objections have been advanced
the Court, in the course of its reasoning, will consider these obany legal consequences arising from
jections before determining
62
these resolutions.
In context, "will consider" appears to be a euphemism for "has

already decided to reject" and "in the course of its reasoning"
seems to mean "in rationalizing conclusions it has arrived at
through other determinants." In political terms, the Court was
saying that it recognized itself to be without authority to review
or act as appellate court from actions taken by other principal
organs without their specific request to do so, but that no harm
would be done by its undertaking the forbidden review in the
instant case. And no harm was done, the Court upholding the
validity of both the Assembly's and the Council's actions.
61 Id. at 57-58.
62

Id. at 45.
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The Council's action was relatively easy to identify as being
in furtherance of its responsibilities under Chapter V of the
Charter. The Assembly's action was held to be a termination
of a relationship on account of "a deliberate and persistent
violation of obligations which destroys the very object and purpose of that relationship." To the contention that, since the
Covenant had not explicitly conferred upon the Council of the
League the right to terminate a mandate for misconduct of
the mandatory, the U.N. could not have succeeded to any such
power, the Court responded by invoking a general principle of
law that a right to terminate on account of breach must be
presumed to exist in all treaties, except-the Court remembered its 1950 finding that South Africa could not unilaterally
modify the status of the Territory - as regards provisions relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties
of a humanitarian character. Thus, in the Court's view, the
revocability of the mandates by the supervisory power had been
envisaged from the outset of the mandate system.
It had been maintained that the Assembly, not being a
judicial organ and not having previously referred the matter
to such an organ, was not competent to make its findings as to
the status of the Mandate. Referring for the only time in its
opinion to its 1966 decision, the Court recalled that the applicants had been told in that case that they lacked the right to
require the due performance of the sacred trust and that any
divergencies of view concerning the conduct of a mandate had
their place in the political field, the settlement of which lay
between the mandatory and the competent organs of the League.
To deny to a political organ of the United Nations which is a successor of the League in that respect the right to act, on the argument that it lacks competence to render what is described as a
judicial decision, would not only be inconsistent but would amount
to a complete denial of the remedies available63 against fundamental breaches of an international undertaking.

That, and little more, is the gist of the opinion. If the Court
in 1966 saw fit to deny a judicial remedy, the Court in 1971
was not going to forbid a political one, for such a double denial
would amount to denying that the inhabitants of the Territory
could be protected under international law; in other words,
that their human rights were recognizable as legal ones. Correspondingly, the 1971 opinion should probably be read as
putting national sovereigns on record that they are answerable
c. Id. at 49. The Court also rejected an argument that resolution 2145
was invalid as a transfer of territory. Id. at 50.
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at law for deprivations of human rights when they are acting
in an international fiduciary capacity.
One aspect of the Court's handling of the case certain to be
criticized long after the furor of the dispute has subsided is
its insensitivity to charges of juridical bias, specifically directed
against the Republic of South Africa, its Government and its
representatives. Several of the separate opinions went out of
their way to commend the presentation of South Africa's case,
perhaps in recognition of the sometimes preemptory way in
which its various objections and requests were denied. Throughout the history of the Court, and its predecessor, the Permanent
Court of International Justice, the fact and appearance of impartiality have been scrupulously maintained by the Court.
Article 17(2) of the Statute provides that
No member [of the Court] may participate in the decision of any
case in which he has previously taken part as agent, counsel, or
advocate for one of the parties, or as a member of a national
or international court, or of a commission of enquiry, or in any
other capacity.
Paragraph 3 of Article 17 leaves to the Court the resolution of
any doubts as to the applicability of the provision in a given
instance, but the substance, clearly, puts a burden of proof on
a judge accused of violating the provision. In the South West
Africa Cases, as noted, Judge Zafrullah Khan had reluctantly
recused himself from sitting, a circumstance which has never
been publicly explained, but one nonetheless which hindsight
shows to have been decisive in the outcome of the judgment.
In Namibia, Zafrullah Khan was the President of the Court.
In Namibia, South Africa had objected to the participation
of three of the judges: Zafrullah Khan, Padilla Nervo and
Morozov. In each case, the objection was based upon what had
allegedly been statements and active participation by the judge
in the South West Africa dispute in his former capacity as representative of his government at the U.N. during the pendency
of the debates over the dispute. In Judge Morozov's case, these
activities allegedly continued through the period in which the
General Assembly was taking its substantive action upon which
the Security Council's request for an advisory opinion was based.
In Judge Zafrullah Kahn's case, attention was also drawn to
his having been named as ad hoc judge by Ethiopia and Liberia
in the South West Africa Cases, prior to his election as a regular member of the Court. 4
64 See Statement of the Government of South Africa dated November 19,
1970, at 121-26 and Annexes B, C, D and F to ch. IV thereof [hereinafter
cited as 1970 statement].
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The Court rejected all three objections, citing its refusal
to accede to a similar objection to the composition of the bench
by South Africa in the South West Africa Cases65 (but neglecting to point out that the vote to deny South Africa's objection
in that instance had been a mere 8 to 6), and also citing four
PCIJ "precedents" which, presumably, bear on the point at
issue. 6 The Court took no note of Zafrullah Khan's having
recused himself in 1966.
The present writer must acknowledge his inability to comprehend the similarity between the situations involved in the
precedents and the statements and activities complained of
by South Africa in extensio. One of the precedents, in fact,
turned on a specific finding that the previous functions whose
compatibility was in question (the judge himself having asked
the Court for guidance) were not objectionable "since they had
been exercised before the dispute actually before the Court had
arisen. 0 6 7 Inasmuch as the Court's opinion in Namibia integrates the General Assembly's action in adopting resolution
2145 with the subsequent Security Council action leading to
the request for an advisory opinion, it is difficult to see how the
precedent applies, particularly in the case of Judge Morozov.
The Court must have regarded the instances it cited as
verification of the principle that service as a representative of
one's government does not in itself bring Article 17 into play.
However, the judges to whom South Africa had objected were
ones who it maintained had played such leading and outspoken
roles in the attacks on South Africa as to far exceed the
normal bounds of representative advocacy. Indeed, it is difficult
to perceive the rational basis on which the Court was able to
conclude that previous activities of the three judges did other
than cast doubt on the impartiality of the judges themselves
and, for that matter, on the bench as a whole. It is possible, of
course, that the Court drew upon material not available to the
public, in which case it would have been more candid to reveal
the existence of such sources than to cite previously decided
instances of dubious comparability. It should be noted that five
judges expressed serious reservations about the Court's rejection
of South Africa's objections to the composition of the bench.
South Africa's request for the appointment of an ad hoc
65 Order dated 18 March 1965.
66 P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 1, at 11; P.C.I.J. ser. C, No. 84, at 535; P.C.I.J. ser. E,
No. 4, at 270; P.C.I.J. ser. E, No. 8, at 251.
67

P.C.I.J. ser. E, No. 4, at 270. See also P.C.I.J. ser. E, No. 6, at 282; and

compare P.C.I.J. ser. E, No. 7, at 287.
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judge was also rejected. 8 From the Court's opinion, it appears
that this denial resulted from a finding that the Court was not
acting "upon a legal question actually pending between two or
more States," these being the words of Rule 83 of the Court's
rules of procedure which brings into play Article 31 of the
Statute (that being the provision for the appointment of ad hoc
judges). South Africa, recalling the 1962 decision, contended
that if it had been correctly decided, then the relevant legal
question before the Court did indeed relate to an existing dispute between South Africa and other States"6 The existence of
such a dispute was also relevant to South Africa's claim that
the Court, in the exercise of its discretion under Article 65(1)
of the Charter, ought to decline to give an opinion.
South Africa advanced two sets of factors for the Court to
bear in mind in deciding whether or not to entertain the question posed by the Security Council. The first was the immensity
of the political pressure to which the Court had been subjected
as a result of its 1966 decision and the continuing pressure it was
allegedly under to "make amends" by deciding against South
Africa in the instant case. 0 The Court replied in the imperative:
It would not be proper for the Court to entertain these observations, bearing as they do on the very nature of the Court
as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, an organ
which, in that capacity, acts only on the basis of the law, inde-

pendently of all outside interference or interventions whatsoever,
in the exercise of the judicial functions entrusted to it alone
A court functioning as a court of
by the Charter and its Statute.
71
law can act in no other way.
Self-righteous indignation often, as here, is a diversionary tactic,
avoiding the question by pretending that it is so preposterous
that its mere consideration is an unworthy enterprise. Nevertheless, say what it will, the Court had been put on notice and publicly, too - that its choice was between coming into
harmony with the attitude toward South Africa prevailing in
the General Assembly and Security Council, on the one hand,
and going out of existence, on the other.7 2 The correct response
Order dated 29 January 1971.
69 1970 statement, supra note 64, at 101.
70 Id. at 104 passim.
71 [1971] I.C.J. Rep. at 23.
68

72

Even in the General Assembly's Sixth Committee (Legal), the Court
was under attack. An initiative in that Committee to study ways of
enhancing the role of the Court evoked little enthusiasm other than
from its twenty initial sponsors, some outright hostility- mostly from
the Soviet Union, which maintains that the existing allocation of com-

petence among the U.N.'s organs ought not be reconsidered

-and

fairly widespread apathy. Sponsors of the initiative were obliged
to seek safety in a compromise resolution postponing until the twentysixth session of the General Assembly consideration of the question
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for the Court to have given would have consisted of an examination of its collective predispositions, to determine whether
the circumstances in which the question came before the Court
precluded its impartial adjudication. The statement that courts
of law, by their very nature, act independently of all outside
interference or interventions whatsoever is simply untenable;
they do not always do so, and as South Africa maintained,
ought to decline to hear any case presented in which the judiciary's collective impartiality or freedom from outside interference is seriously in doubt. In the international arena, that
doubt may be resolved in the first instance by the Court itself,
and in the final analysis by the political process which transforms the Court's rulings into social action. The Court, in
effect, chose to leave the matter entirely to the political process.
If you doubt our integrity, it appeared to say, that is too fundamental an objection for us to consider ourselves.
South Africa had put forward a second combination of
factors which, it said, compelled the conclusion that, even if
the Court were entitled to render an advisory opinion, it should
as a matter of judicial discretion decline to do so. Article
65(1) of the Statute authorizes the Court -but does not require
it - to give an advisory opinion on "any legal question" asked
of it by an authorized body. South Africa conceded that there
is no precise line between "legal" and "political" questions and
that a "political" question may also be a "legal" one.7 3 However, it felt that the question posed by the Security Council
was so intertwined with political issues and had a political
background in which the Court itself had become so embroiled
that the proper exercise of the Court's judicial functions was
seriously compromised. Moreover, South Africa contended, the
relevant legal dispute related to an existing dispute between
South Africa and other States, a circumstance which the Permanent Court, in the Eastern Carelia case, had regarded as rendering the advisory machinery of the Court inappropriate.
Finally, South Africa argued, in order -to answer the question
posed by South Africa the Court would have to decide legal
and factual issues which were actually in dispute, a circumof whether to establish an ad hoc committee to study the role of the

Court. Those who maintain hope for the prospects of international
adjudication will seek to enlist enough diplomatic support to establish
the committee, but even now the prospects for any substantive recommendations the committee may ultimately make are regarded as uncertain. Had the Namibia opinion gone in favor of South Africa, uncertainty might have become improbability.
73 1970 statement, supra note 64, at 102.
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stance which Eastern Carelia also noted as a factor leading to
its conclusion not to hear the question therein posed.
In that case, the Council of the League had requested an
opinion on whether the Peace Treaty of October 14, 1920
between Finland and Russia and an annexed Declaration thereto
by the Russian Delegation regarding the autonomy of Eastern
Carelia placed Russia under an obligation to Finland to carry
out the Treaty's provisions with respect to that region. Russia,
not a Member of the League, had categorically refused to take
part in the League's consideration of the dispute and had objected to the Court's hearing the case on the further grounds
that it was a matter falling within Russia's own domestic
jurisdiction.
Article 14 of the Covenant of the League, in effect at the
time of the Eastern Carelia case, authorized the Permanent
Court to render an advisory opinion on "any dispute or question
referred to it" by an authorized organ. The difference in language
between this Article 14 and Article 65 of the Statute has had the
effect, inter alia, of encouraging the Court to emphasize that
74
treaty interpretation, for example, is a distinctly judicial task;
however, as South Africa rightly maintained in its Statement,. 5
this did not mean that the interpretation of an international
instrument was invariably a task the Court ought to undertake.
In Eastern Carelia, the Court had declined to give an advisory opinion on several grounds, the first being that the
opinion bore upon an actual dispute between Finland and
Russia and that
It is well established in international law that no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other
States either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind
of pacific settlement. 76
In addition, the Permanent Court had felt it inexpedient to
attempt to deal with the question because it turned upon a
determination of factual issues which the Court, in the absence
of Russia's cooperation, would be at a disadvantage in making.
In dicta for which the case has become noted, the Court then
said:
The Court is aware cf the fact that it is not requested to decide
a dispute, but to give an advisory opinion. This circumstance,
however, does not essentially modify the above considerations.
The question put to the Court is not one of abstract law, but concerns directly the main point of the controversy between FinSee Gordon, supra note 3, at 800.
75 1970 statement, supra note 64, at 101.
76 P.C.I.J. ser. B, No. 5, at 27.
74
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land and Russia, and can only be decided by an investigation into
the facts underlying the case. Answering the question would be
substantially equivalent to deciding the dispute between the
parties. The Court, being a Court of Justice, cannot, even in giving advisory opinions, depart from the essential rules guiding
77
[its] activity as a Court.

Distinguishing Eastern Carelia, the Court in Namibia pointed
out, inter alia, that South Africa had been a Member of the
United Nations, had been bound by the decision of its competent
organ to request an advisory opinion, and had actually appeared
before the Court and addressed itself to the merits. The Security Council's request did not relate to a legal dispute actually
pending between two or more States (or, for that matter, between South Africa and the U.N.):
It is not the purpose of the request to obtain the assistance of the
Court in the exercise of the Security Council's functions relating
to the pacific settlement of a dispute pending before it between
two or more States. The request is put forward by a United
Nations organ with reference to its own decisions and it seeks
Court on the consequences and implications of
advice from the
78
these decisions.

Some fact-finding is inherent in all advisory opinions, the Court
noted, adding that this had been true of the three previous
advisory opinions on South West Africa in which South Africa
had not seen fit to question the propriety of the Court's giving
Recalling its Genocide Convention opinion, 79 the Court oban opinion.
Recalling its Genocide Convention opinion, 79 the Court observed that a "reply to a request for an Opinion should not, in
principle, be refused."80 It found no compelling reasons to refuse
to do so in the instant case:
Moreover, [the Court] feels that by replying to the request it
would not only 'remain faithful to the requirements of its judicial
character' . . . , but [would] also discharge its functions as 'the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations'. ...81

The point the Court chose not to stress, once again, was
that the international law prevailing in the days of the Eastern
Carelia case (1923) was sovereignty-oriented, that the Premanent Court's dicta grew out of the notion that it could not
compel Russia to reach a pacific settlement. In other parts of
its Namibia opinion, the Court gave a detailed account of the
77 Id.

at 29.
7N[1971] I.C.J. Rep. at 24.

79 Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. at 19.
80 [1971] I.C.J. Rep. at 27.
81 Id. The reference to remaining faithful to the requirements of its judicial character alludes to the Court's Advisory Opinion on the Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Consultative Organization, [1960] I.C.J. Rep. at 150.

OLD ORTHODOXIES AMID NEW EXPERIENCES

changes in international law since the Mandate's origin, observing at one point that
its interpretation [of the Mandate] cannot remain unaffected by
the subsequent development of law, through the Charter of the
United Nations and by way of customary law....

In this domain,

as elsewhere, the corpus juris gentium has been considerably enif it is faithfully to discharge its funcriched, and this the Court,
2
tions, may not ignore.6
In Namibia, unlike the South West Africa Cases, the Court
saw as its duty, or perhaps as its only life-sustaining choice,
following the political lead of the General Assembly and the
Security Council. From the standpoint of institutional wisdom
the Court's conclusion was understandable. Whether or not it
will serve the Court in the long run, however, remains to be
seen, for the Court is not apt to be judged favorably, in Hottelet's terms of reference, for merely surviving.
Nor, after the current anti-South Africa sentiment has gone
its historical way, is the Court's too avid rejection of that government's every claim likely to impress future analysts of the
principal judicial organ. Denunciation of South Africa's racial
policies may indeed be called for and one may not reasonably
doubt that the Mandate has been abused in this respect. That
the Court accepted as its own concurrent responsibility such
denunciation may be laudable in its own right, but does not
entirely redeem an otherwise uninspired judicial performance.
SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The South West Africa litigation presented the Court with
prodigious problems, not so much because of the nature of the
dispute, as is often maintained, but because the dispute's history
attaches to two distinct periods in the modern development of
international law, periods which have been accompanied by corresponding changes in the nature of adjudication generally, and
the adjudicative process of the Court in particular. What distinguishes the South West Africa Cases from the Namibia opinion, as much as the specific holdings themselves, are the divergent expectations concerning the nature of the Court as a
decision-making process, the juridical relevance of the objectives
of the Charter and the social outcome of the Court's judgments,
and the role the Court should play within the larger political
process of which its decision-making is a part. These divergent
attitudes must be inferred; neither of the two judgments pauses
to consider them rationally.
82

[1971] I.C.J. Rep. at 31.
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Were the judges to have adopted an attitude of existential
.responsibility for developing the institution, in accordance with
the requirements of international life, then the troublesome
litigation discussed herein by now would have served the purpose of enhancing the potential utility of the Court to the world
community. However, beset by a decline in popular enchantment with international adjudication as a dispute settlement
modality, the judges have instead chosen to cling publicly to
outworn jurisprudential banners and to accept the verity of
reified concepts which, for the most part, are alienated from
rational and empirical judicial analysis. Dancing to rhythms the
band is no longer playing, the Court remains inelegantly out of
step, its latest judgment more popular than its earlier one, but
no less an attempt to vindicate old orthodoxies in the face of
new experiences.

